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OWNER PROVISION OF 21
U.S.C § 881 (a) (7)
ROBERT E. BLACHER
I. INTRODUCTION
"The devil died in December," and thousands cheered. "A
shower of gunfire, and there was Pablo Escobar, a punctured corpse
on a rooftop in Medellin, leaking life just like everyjudge and cop and
political candidate he disposed of without a blink."2 On Wednesday, I
December 1993, Pablo Escobar celebrated his forty-fourth birthday.3
On 2 December 1993, police and soldiers raided his hideout and
gunned him down as he tried to escape over the rooftops. 4 After a
lifetime of crime and twenty minutes of gunfire, the king of cocaine
was dead.
The Colombian soldiers celebrated, cheering "we won."5 Presi-
dent Clinton sent President Trugillo of Colombia a telegram congrat-
ulating him on the raid.6 On that day, the world rejoiced and enjoyed
a slight victory in the war on drugs.
Ultimately, however, United States officials recognized that Esco-
1 S.L. Price, The Spector of Violent Drug Cartels Haunts the Formidable Columbian National
Soccer Team, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 23, 1994, at 62.
2 Id.
3 Robert D. McFadden, Head of Medellin Cocaine Cartel is Killed by Troops in Colombia,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1993, at A12.
4 Id.





bar's death was merely a symbolic victory, and would not reduce the
flow of cocaine into the United States.7 Drug trafficking is a billion
dollar industry.8 The tremendous potential for profit creates a large
incentive to participate in the drug trade.9 And while draconian
measures, such as the hunting and killing of a drug lord, are sadisti-
cally celebrated, they are not practical. As a result, Congress has de-
termined that the best way to combat illegal trafficking is to remove
the incentive by stripping the profits from the drug dealers through
asset forfeiture.10
The civil forfeiture statute" has evolved into a powerful weapon
in the government's war on drugs. That evolution has included the
enactment of various provisions which have significantly expanded
the reach of civil forfeiture. Among those was the enactment of
§ 881(a) (7), which extended the scope of civil forfeiture to include
real property.'2 Recognizing the potentially harsh effects of the stat-
ute, Congress provided an affirmative defense to owners of real prop-
erty who are innocent of illegal activity. This "innocent owner"
defense allows real property owners to avoid forfeiture by proving that
the illegal activity occurred without their "knowledge or consent."
This provision has caused courts to consider whether claimants must
show a lack of both knowledge and consent, or merely a lack of one or
the other.
This comment will examine that controversy. Part II will set the
stage by exploring the history of forfeiture law, discussing the develop-
ment and evolution of 21 U.S.C. § 881 to its current state, and describ-
ing the procedure outlined in the statute. Part III will then explain
the promulgation of the "innocent owner" defense and describe the
controversy over its interpretation. Next, Part IV will examine the lan-
guage of the "innocent owner" provision, its legislative history, the leg-
islative history of related provisions, and subsequent clarifications of
the provision by Congress. A thorough analysis of these sources will
show that claimants must prove a lack of both knowledge and consent
to satisfy the terms of the provision. This Part will then examine equi-
table and constitutional considerations which strengthen that inter-
pretation. Finally, Part V recognizes the inadequacy of the current
statute, encourages Congress to address the issue, and suggests a new
7 Id.
8 BuREAu OFJUSTICE STATISTIcS, DRUGS, CRIME, AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 126 (1992).
9 S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1984), repinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3374.
10 Id.
11 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988).
12 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988).
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version of the "innocent owner" provision.
II. SETTING THE STAGE
A. HISTORY
The concept of civil forfeiture is firmly rooted in history. Its ori-
gins date back to the Old Testament.13 It was recognized in ancient
Rome, 14 as well as in ancient Greece. 15 Initially, most societies viewed
forfeiture as a way to punish property that caused injury to a person.16
Superstition led people to personify the property, place blame upon it
for the injury or wrong, and believe that it suffered morally.17 In cer-
tain cases, this belief was so strong that the property was forfeited even
if it belonged to the injured party.' 8
Modem statutes allowing for civil in rem forfeiture appear to have
evolved most closely from the concept of the English deodand.19
Under early English law, anything causing the death of one of the
King's subjects was forfeited to the Crown. 20 The object forfeited, the
deodand, was considered an "accused thing."21 Once forfeited, the
object was supposed to be put to charitable uses.22 Over time, how-
ever, the practice became corrupt, and the king used the property for
his own benefit, as a source of revenue. 23 As a result, the colonists did
not carry the concept of the deodand with them across the Atlantic. 2 4
13 The book of Exodus describes the earliest known forfeiture law: "If an ox gore a man
or a woman, that they die: then the ox shall be surely stoned, and his flesh shall not be
eaten; but the owner of the ox shall be quit." 21 Exodus 28:8.
14 As early as 451 B.C.E., Roman law recognized civil forfeiture: "if a quadruped causes
injury to anyone, let the owner tender him the estimated amount of the damage; and if he
is unwilling to accept it, the owner shall... surrender the animal that caused the injury."
OUVER WENDELL HoLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 8 n.6 (1945).
15 AEchines, who lived between 389-314 B.C.E., told of civil forfeiture: "[W]e banish
beyond our borders stocks and stones and steal, voiceless and mindless things, if they
chance to kill a man; and if a man commits suicide, bury the hand that struck the blow,
afar from the body." Id. at 8.
16 Parker-Harris Co. v. Tate, 188 S.W. 54, 55 (Tenn. 1916).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 United States v. Schmalfeldt, 657 F. Supp. 385, 387-88 (W.D. Mich. 1987). The word
"deodand" is taken from the Latin phrase Deo Dandum, meaning "to be given to God."
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 n.16 (1974).
20 "Where a man killeth another with the sword of John at Stile, the sword shall be
forfeit as deodand, and yet no default is in the owner." HoLMEs, supra note 14, at 25.
21 Id. at 24. According to Holmes, a desire for vengeance on the offending object was
the original purpose behind the concept of the deodand. Compensation, if relevant at all,
was a secondary consideration. Id. at 34.
22 Schmalfeld4 657 F. Supp. at 388.
23 Parker-Harris Co. v. Tate, 188 S.W. 54, 55 (Tenn. 1916).
24 Schmalfeldt, 657 F. Supp. at 388. Although the concept of the deodand did not for-
mally become part of American law, Judge Enslen has observed that traces of the English
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They did, however, continue to utilize civil forfeiture as a means of
enforcing the law.2 5
After the ratification of the Constitution, the Federal government
began enforcing forfeiture statutes. 26 Initially, the government used
its forfeiture power to seize ships and cargos used in the illegal slave
trade, as well as vessels involved in customs offenses.2 7 Congress soon
expanded its use of forfeiture, and "[f]or more than two hundred
years, Congress has continued to pass civil, in rem, forfeiture statutes
covering a substantial variety of property."28 In fact, "contemporary
federal and State forfeiture statutes reach virtually any type of prop-
erty that might be used in the conduct of a criminal enterprise."29
Until recently, two aspects of civil forfeiture had remained con-
stant: its relative insignificance as a law enforcement tool3 0 and the
irrelevance of the innocence of the owner of property seized.31 This
irrelevance was "firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurispru-
practice remain:
The concept of the deodand has been transformed by the historical process. A more
secular society has substituted another sovereign, the government... for the Church
and the Crown. Thus forfeited property is no longer 'applied to pious uses, and dis-
tributed in alms by the high almoner,' but rather it may, under appropriate circum-
stances, be either sold, destroyed, or retained for official use by the Attorney General.
Id. See also 21 U.S.C. § 881(e) (1988 & Supp. V 1992).
In Goldsmith v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510 (1921),Justice McKenna also recognized
the influence of the deodand. He noted that Congress ascribed a degree of complicity and
guilt to property associated with violations of the revenue provisions, which he saw as
analogous to the law of deodand.
25 C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 139 (1943). Long before the adoption of
the Constitution, the colonial courts exercised in remi jurisdiction while enforcing English
and local forfeiture statutes. During the Confederation period, the state courts did the
same. Id. However, the law of forfeiture varied from colony to colony. For instance, stat-
utes regulating forfeiture consequent to attainder were used extensively in Pennsylvania
and Virginia, minimally in Massachusetts, and not at all in New York. James R. Maxeiner,
Bane of American Forfeiture Law-Banished At LastP, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 768, 776-77 (1977).
The practice of forfeiture consequent to attainder, which called for the complete forfei-
ture of all real and personal property of convicted felons and traitors sentenced to death,
was discarded after the ratification of the Constitution, because the practice deprived inno-
cent heirs of their rightful inheritance, it "too easily dispensed with judicial findings of
guilt," and because of a desire to "end all vestiges of the feudal era." Id. at 770, 779 n.68.
26 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683 (1974).
27 Id.
28 HARRY L. MYERS & JOSEPH P. Bizosrowsm, DRUG AGENTS' GUIDE TO FoRFirruRE OF
ASSETS 11 (William M. Lenck ed., 1987) [hereinafter DRUG GUIDE] (listing numerous civil
forfeiture statutes covering the history of the United States, and applying to property rang-
ing from Pirate Vessels and War Materials, to Adulterated Food and Drugs and Hampers
and Baskets).
29 Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683.
30 DRUG GUIDE, supra, note 28, at 1.
31 Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683 ("[Tlhe innocence of the owner of property subject to
forfeiture has almost uniformly been rejected as a defense."). Early British law allowed for
seizure even if "no default is in the owner." HoLMEs, supra note 14, at 25.
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dence of the country."3 2 In 1970, however, Congress propelled forfei-
ture into its present place in the front lines of the government's war
on drugs and paved the way for the battle over innocent ownership
rights.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF 21 U.s.c. § 881
In an effort to strengthen law enforcement authority against drug
trafficking,33 Congress passed The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Pre-
vention and Control Act of 1970 as part of the Controlled Substances
Act.34 Congress recognized that the motivation for drug trafficking
was economic profit 35 and realized that it needed something more
than ordinary criminal sanctions, such as fines and imprisonment, to
deter people from dealing drugs.36 Congress sought a means of elimi-
nating the economic gain and thus removing the incentive to partici-
pate in the drug trade.3 7 Forfeiture became Congress' weapon of
choice.38
Originally, § 881 authorized the forfeiture of controlled sub-
stances, raw materials, containers, and conveyances used or intended
for use in drug related activities.3 9 However, by 1978, Congress real-
32 Goldsmith v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921). Several cases effectively illus-
trate this point. In United States v. The Little Charles, 26 F. Cas. 979 (C.C.D. Va. 1818)
(No. 15,612), the Court upheld the forfeiture of a schooner seized for a violation of the
embargo laws. ChiefJustice Marshall, writing for the majority, stated that the "proceeding
[was one] against the vessel, for an offence committed by the vessel, which is not less an
offence, and does not the less subject her to forfeiture because it was committed without
the authority and against the will of the owner." In United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12
U.S. (8 Cranch) 398 (1814), the Court upheld the forfeiture of coffee sold in violation of
the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809. Although the purchaser was innocent, the Court rea-
soned that "[i]n the eternal struggle that exists between the avarice, enterprize and combi-
nations of individuals on the one hand, and the power charged with the administration of
the laws on the other, severe laws are rendered necessary to enable the executive to carry
into effect the measure of policy adopted by the legislature." Id. at 405. In 1877, the Court
upheld the forfeiture of an innocent owner's property which housed a distillery in viola-
tion of the revenue laws (15 Stat. 132), declaring that the offense was "attached primarily
to the distillery, and the real and personal property used in connection with the same,
without any regard whatsoever to the personal misconduct or responsibility of the owner."
Dobbins's Distillery v. United States, 96 U.S. 395, 401 (1877).
33 H.R REP. No. 91-1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, at 1-26 (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566.
34 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (1970).
35 S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. at 3374.
36 Id.
37 116 CONG. REc. 607 (1970).
38 "Clearly, if law enforcement efforts to combat racketeering and drug trafficking are
to be successful, they must include an attack on the economic aspects of these crimes.
Forfeiture is the mechanism through which such an attack may be made." S. REP. No. 225,
supra note 9, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3374.
39 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a): The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States
and no property right shall exist in them:
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ized that the forfeiture laws were not producing the desired results.40
Therefore, in 1978, Congress amended the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act and increased the effectiveness of
forfeiture by expanding the scope of the forfeiture provision to allow
the forfeiture of all proceeds derived from drug transactions. 41 In this
manner, Congress hoped to strike directly at the heart of the prob-
lem-the potential to realize incredible profits through drug deal-
ing.42 By 1984, however, Congress remained unsatisfied with the
impact of the expanded forfeiture laws. Drug profits were not being
undercut.43 Apparently the scope of property subject to forfeiture was
still too limited for Congress' taste, because the statute did not pro-
vide for the forfeiture of real property, even if that property was in-
strumental to the performance of illicit activities.44 As a result, in
(1) All controlled substances which have been manufactured, distributed, dispensed,
or acquired in violation of this subchapter.
(2) All raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind which are used, or in-
tended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, importing, or ex-
porting any controlled substance in violation of this subchapter.
(3) All property which is used or intended for use, as a container for property de-
scribed in paragraph (1), (2), or (9).
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are in-
tended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt,
possession, or concealment of property described in paragraph (1), (2), or (9)....
40 Senator Nunn realized that "[w]e were losing the battle as well as the war" against
drugs. 124 CONG. REc. 23,055 (1978).
41 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (6): "All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other
things of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a
controlled substance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an ex-
change, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be
used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter .... " Id.
42 According to Senator Nunn, "profit, astronomical profit, is the base motivation of
drug traffickers. The amendment I propose here today is intended to enhance the efforts
to reduce the flow of illicit drugs in the United States by striking out against the profits
from illicit drug trafficking." 124 CONG. REc. 23,055 (1978). Senator John Culver also
calculated that this expansion of the forfeiture laws would "disrupt drug trafficking by
greatly raising the risk of such trafficking, reducing the profits involved and immobilizing
certain drug rings by seizing large amounts of their assets." Id at 23,056.
43 A study released in 1981 by the General Accounting Office (GAO), entitled AssEr
FoaFmrruREa-A SELDOM UsED TOOL IN COMBATrING DRUG TRAFFMKING, reported two major
reasons why the forfeiture statutes had failed to meet Congress' expectations: federal law
enforcement agencies had not aggressively pursued forfeiture, and current forfeiture stat-
utes had too many limitations and ambiguities, which prevented forfeiture's full potential
from being realized. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3374.
William Anderson, the director of the GAO, noted that in 1979, drug trafficking pro-
duced an estimated $54 billion worth of income for drug dealers, but forfeitures amounted
to less than $35 million. In other words, the drug dealers were able to retain almost 99%
of their profits-a clear indication that forfeiture had not succeeded in depriving dealers
of their economic base. Id.
44 According to the Senate report accompanying the 1984 amendments:
Under current law, if a person uses a boat or car to transport narcotics or uses equip-
ment to manufacture dangerous drugs, his use of the property renders it subject to
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1984, Congress added § 881 (a) (7) to 21 U.S.C., expanding the class of
property subject to forfeiture to include all real property used in any
manner to facilitate a violation of drug laws. 45
C. PROCEDURE UNDER 21 U.s.c. § 881
A civil forfeiture occurs when the government takes illegally used
or acquired property without compensating its owner.46 A forfeiture
action, an in rem procedure, 47 commences when the government
seizes property believed to be connected with illegal drug activity.48
Ownership of the property vests in the government at the time the
property is used for an illegal purpose. 49 But once the government
has seized the property, it must begin a formal forfeiture action within
five years of the discovery of the alleged offense.50
Initially, the burden of proof is on the government to show prob-
able cause that the seized property was connected with illegal drug
activity. 51  Courts have defined probable cause as "a reasonable
ground for belief of guilt, supported by less than prima facie proof,
civil forfeiture. But if he uses a secluded barn to store tons of marihuana or uses his
house as a manufacturing laboratory for amphetamines, there is no provision to sub-
ject his real property to civil forfeiture, even though its use was indispensable to the
commission of a major drug offense and the prospect of the forfeiture of the property
would have been a powerful deterrent.
S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3378.
45 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (7) (1988) reads in pertinent part: "All real property, including
any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or
tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended to be
used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of
this subchapter...." Id.
46 BuREAu OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DRUGS, CRIME, AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 156 (Dec.
1992).
47 An in rem procedure is a procedure "against the thing." Action is taken against the
property rather than the person, and the purpose is to affect the person's interest in that
property. See BLAcK's LAw DIaToNARY 793 (6th ed. 1991).
48 Basically, the government can institute civil forfeiture proceedings by following the
process set forth in the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime claims,
obtaining a seizure warrant in the manner provided for in the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, or seizing property without judicial process if the Attorney General has prob-
able cause. For an in depth discussion of the government's various procedural options for
seizing property, see Marc. B. Stahl, Asset Forfeiture, Burdens of Proof and the War on Drugs, 83
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 274, 279-81 (1992).
49 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) ("All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection
(a) of this section shall vest in the United States upon commission of the act giving rise to
forfeiture under this section.").
50 19 U.S.C. § 1621 (1988).
51 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1988) states that the customs laws govern the procedure for
forfeiture under § 881. The relevant provision is 19 U.S.C. § 1615, which states that "in all
suits or actions.., where the property is claimed by any person, the burden of proof shall
lie upon such claimant... [pirovided, that probable cause shall be first shown for the institution of
such suit or action, to be judged by the court... ." 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1988) (emphasis added).
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but more than reasonable suspicion."5 2 Once.the government shows
probable cause, the burden shifts to claimants to prove, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, either that the property was not connected
in any way with the illicit activity, or that they qualify for "innocent
owner" exemption under the relevant statutory provision.53
III. PREPARING FOR BATTLE
A. INNOCENT OWNERSHIP PROVISIONS IN § 881 (A)
Historically, the only remedy for an innocent owner with an inter-
est in forfeited property was to petition the United States Attorney
General for remission or mitigation.54 Property owners could not pre-
vent forfeiture of their ownership rights by arguing that they were in-
nocent of drug activity; they could merely request that the Attorney
General return all or part of the property.5 5 In 1978, however, Con-
gress amended § 881(a) (6) and provided protection for owners who
had no "knowledge or consent" of the illegal activity in which their
property was involved. 56 When real property became forfeitable
under § 881, Congress added another "innocent owner" provision to
protect property owners whose property had been used in violation of
the law without their "knowledge or consent."57 In 1988, an amend-
ment to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (4) added a requirement that claimants
prove the illegal activity occurred without their "knowledge, consent,
52 United States v. 4,657 Acres, 730 F. Supp. 423, 425 (S.D. Fla. 1989). See also United
States v. One 1950 Buick Sedan, 231 F.2d 219, 221-22, (3d Cir. 1956) (defining probable
cause as "a reasonable ground for belief of guilt," existing where "the facts and circum-
stances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy in-
formation [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief that an offense has been or is being committed"). To establish probable cause, the
government may rely on circumstantial evidence or hearsay.
53 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1988). The Ninth Circuit ruled this shifting of burdens constitu-
tional in United States v. One 1970 Pontiac GTO, 529 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1976). See also
United States v. One 1980 Bertram 58' Motor Yacht, 876 F.2d 884 (11th Cir. 1989); United
States v. One 1975 Ford F 100 Pick Up Truck, 558 F.2d 755, 756 (5th Cir. 1977); United
States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 699 F. Supp. 1531, 1534 (S.D. Fla. 1988); United States v.
M/V Christy Lee, 640 F. Supp. 667, 672 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
54 See DRUG GUIDE, supra note 28, at 228.
55 Id.
56 The "innocent owner" defense states that "no property shall be forfeited under this
paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission
established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or
consent of that owner." 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (6) (1988).
57 "[N]o property shall be forfeited under this'paragraph, to the extent of an interest of
an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been commit-
ted or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner." 2f U.S.C. § 881 (a) (7)
(1988). The fact that (a) (6) refers to "the interest of an owner," and (a) (7) refers to "an
interest of an owner," appears to be an irrelevant distinction. -
1994]
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or willful blindness."58 Congress added "willful blindness" to ensure
that the owner of a conveyance would not purposefully avoid gaining
knowledge of illegal activity.5 9
B. THE BIG QUESTION
When Congress amended § 881 in 1984, its announced purpose
was to "eliminate the statutory limitations and ambiguities that [had]
frustrated active pursuit of forfeiture by Federal law enforcement
agencies." 60 The inclusion of (a) (7) may have increased the govern-
ment's ability to subject property to forfeiture, but the language Con-
gress chose-"without the knowledge or consent of that owner"6 1-
has caused confusion in the courts.
The big question is whether courts should read the phrase "with-
out knowledge or consent" in the conjunctive or in the disjunctive:
does it mean "without knowledge and without consent," or "without
knowledge or without consent?" For example, a landlord claims to be
the "innocent owner" of an apartment building in a drug case. He
can establish that he never gave his consent to use his building during
drug deals. The question is whether the statute also requires him to
prove that he had no knowledge that dealers were using his building
to traffic drugs.
Four circuits have addressed this issue. Both the Ninth and the
Eleventh Circuits have interpreted the "innocent owner" provision in
the conjunctive and would require the landlord to prove lack of con-
sent and knowledge.62 In contrast, the Second and Third Circuits in-
58 For a time, innocent owners enjoyed a bit more protection from forfeiture of con-
veyed property. Until 1988, a conveyance could not be forfeited if it was used as a common
carrier in a business transaction and the illegal activity occurred without the owner's con-
sent, or if the illegal act occurred while the conveyance was in the unlawful possession of
the person who violated the law. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (4) (A) & (B). However, Congress
added § 881(a) (4) (C) which states that "no conveyance shall be forfeited under this para-
graph to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established
by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge, consent, or
willful blindness of the owner." 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (4) (C) (1988).
59 134 CONG. Rac. 24,086 (1988).
60 SEN. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3375.
61 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988).
62 United States v. 6960 Miraflores Ave., 995 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1993); United States
v. Lot ll1-B, 902 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894
F.2d 1511 (11th Cir. 1990). Actually, the Eleventh Circuit has not firmly committed itself.
In both 1990 and 1991 it endorsed a conjunctive interpretation. See, e.g., United States v.
15603 85th Ave. N., 933 F.2d 976 (11th Cir. 1991); 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d at 1511.
But in 1992, it favored a disjunctive interpretation. See, e.g., United States v. 1012 German-
town Rd., 963 F.2d 1496, 1503 (11th Cir. 1992). Ultimately, however, it reverted back to a
conjunctive reading. See, e.g., 6960 Miraflores Ave., 995 F.2d at 1558.
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terpret the phrase in the disjunctive.63 The Sixth Circuit has
suggested that courts read the statute in the disjunctive, but it has not
directly decided the issue.64
IV. THE BOTrOM LmE
Those who argue that courts must read the phrase "without
knowledge or consent" in the disjunctive claim that canons of statu-
tory construction, the statute's legislative history, and general fairness
require that interpretation. This comment will demonstrate that
none of these grounds is ultimately persuasive. Instead, the "innocent
owner" provision of § 881(a) (7), as promulgated by Congress, unam-
biguously requires that claimants prove both a lack of consent and a
lack of knowledge to prevent forfeiture of their property.
A. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
As a general rule, the established canons of statutory construction
require that "terms connected by a disjunctive be given separate
meanings, unless the context dictates otherwise."65 Certain courts
have held that this rule entitles claimants to prove either a lack of
knowledge or a lack of consent.66 In their view, Congress' use of the
word "or" is conclusive evidence that claimants have the option of
proving either fact.67
For example, in United States v. 1 71-02 Liberty Ave.,68 the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York allowed a
63 United States v. 19 and 25 Castle St., 31 F.3d 35, 39 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v.
717 S. Woodward St., 2 F.3d 529 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. 755 Forest Rd., 985 F.2d
70 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. dnied,
498 U.S. 1109 (1991); United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1989).
64 United States v. 14307 Four Lakes Drive, 1 F.3d 1242 (6th Cir. 1993) ("Several of this
Court's (unpublished) opinions make clear that either ignorance or non-consent will suf-
fice to make out an innocent owner defense.").
65 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) (considering § 4 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1989), which provides that "any person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor
in any district court of the United States" and finding that a conjunctive reading would
.rob the term 'property' of its independent and ordinary significance.").
66 United States v. 171-02 Liberty Ave., 710 F. Supp. 46 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). See also 6109
Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d at 618; United States v. 710 Main St., 744 F. Supp. 510, 523 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) ("By reading 'knowledge or consent' in accordance with the canons of statutory
construction, we agree with the courts in 171-02 Liberty Ave., 6109 Grubb Rd., and Sixty (60)
Acres."); United States v. Sixty (60) Acres, 727 F. Supp. 1414 (N.D. Ala. 1990); United States
v. 19026 Oakmont S. Drive, 715 F. Supp. 233, 237 (N.D. Ind. 1989) ("'knowledge or con-
sent' as that term is used in the statute is to be read disjunctively under normal canons of
statutory construction") (quoting 171-02 Liberty Ave., 710 F. Supp. at 46).
67 171-02 Liberty Ave., 710 F. Supp. at 50. ("If Congress had meant to require a showing
of lack of knowledge in all cases.... it could have done so by replacing 'or' with 'and'.").
68 Id. at 46.
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claimant to attempt to prove his lack of consent to illegal drug activity
on his property after he conceded his knowledge of the same activ-
ity.69 The claimant owned a building in a drug infested area. 70 The
police believed that most of the drug activity occurred in a second
floor apartment and asked the claimant to file trespassing charges
against any non-tenants arrested on his property.71 After initially re-
fusing, the claimant cooperated for a while, but soon stopped.72 The
government seized the building.73 Afterwards, the claimant admitted
that he knew about the illegal activity in his building, but argued that
he only needed to prove a lack of consent to that activity to avoid
forfeiture. 74 The court agreed, reasoning that under the canons of
statutory construction, it was obliged to "give effect to Congress' use of
the word 'or' by reading the terms 'knowledge' and 'consent'
disjunctively."75
The court's adherence to a rule which places such blind faith in
Congress' use of language is probably misplaced. In many cases
courts have recognized that the word "or" simply does not mean
"or."76 In De Sylva v. Ballentine,77 the United States Supreme Court
held that courts should not conclude that a statute must be read in
the disjunctive simply because it contains the word "or."78 In De Sylva,
a composer died before renewing the copyrights on some of his musi-
cal compositions. 79 Under the Copyright Act, "the author of such
work, if still living, or the widow, widower, or children of the author, if
the author be not living ... shall be entitled to a renewal."80 The
mother of the deceased composer's illegitimate son sued to insure the
boy's interest in the copyrights.81 She argued that because the statute
used the word "or" in the conjunctive, her son had a present interest
69 Id. at 50.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 46.
73 Id. at 50.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956). See also Unification Church v. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Serv., 762 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (construing relationship be-
tween two provisions of the Equal Access to Justice Act connected with an "or" as being
conjunctive); United States v. Smith, 785 F. Supp. 52 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (interpreting the
phrase punishment by "imprisonment, or a fine, or both," as requiring mandatory impris-
onment for persons convicted of distributing drugs within one thousand feet of a school).
77 351 U.S. 570 (1956).
78 Id. at 573.
79 Id. at 572.
80 17 U.S.C. § 24 (1988).
81 De Sylva, 351 U.S. at 572.
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in the property.8 2 The composer's widow, however, claimed that the
statute employed the word "or" in the disjunctive, and therefore she
had an exclusive right to the copyrights until her death.8 3 After re-
viewing prior copyright acts, the Court determined that it should read
the statute in the conjunctive, and the phrase "or the widow, widower,
or children," meant "or the widow, widower, and children."8 4 The
Court recognized that "the word 'or' is often used as a careless substi-
tute for the word 'and'; that is, it is often used in phrases where 'and'
would express the thought with greater clarity."8 5
Even assuming that Congress was not careless, but intentionally
selected the word "or," a conjunctive interpretation is still correct
under these circumstances. This is one of those cases where the word
"or" creates a multiple rather than an alternative obligation. 86 In fact,
logic compels that conclusion. A principal of logic known as De Mor-
gan's theorem establishes that "[tihe negation of [a] disjunction of
two statements is logically equivalent to the conjunction of their nega-
tions."87 The phrase "knowledge or consent" is ordinarily a disjunc-
tion: the existence of one of two alternatives-knowledge or
consent-satisfies its terms.8 8 If § 881 (a) (7) required claimants to
prove their "knowledge or consent," they would only have to prove
one or the other. However, Congress worded § 881 (a) (7) in the nega-
tive; claimants must prove they were "without knowledge or consent."
According to De Morgan's theorem, the use of the word "without" is
the negation of the disjunction which follows, and is equivalent to the
phrase "without knowledge and without consent."89 Therefore, claim-
ants must prove both a lack of knowledge and a lack of consent.90
Judge Greenberg of the Third Circuit, without mentioning any
82 Id. at 572.
83 Id. at 573.
84 Id. at 580.
85 Id. at 573. See also Unification Church, 762 F.2d at 1084 ("'or' must sometimes be
read as a conjunctive."); C. DALLAS SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONsTRUariON 127
(4th ed. 1985) ("There has been, however, so great laxity in the use of [the terms 'and' and
'or'] that courts have generally said that the words are interchangeable and that one may
be substituted for the other, if consistent with the legislative intent.").
86 IRVING M. Copi, SYMBOuc LOGIC 29 (5th ed. 1979). For example, in the phrase "you
can play outside if it is not raining or sleeting," "or" creates the multiple obligation that it
be neither raining nor sleeting outside.
87 Id. Stated symbolically, the negation of a disjunction is [not (K or C)], and the
conjunction of its negation is [(not K and not C)]. Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. See also Lalit IL Loomba, Note, The Innocent OwnerDefense To Real Property Forfeiture
Under the Comprehensive Crime ControlAct of 1984, 58 FoRDHAM L. Ray. 471, 480 (1989) (con-
cluding that De Morgan's theorem indicates that courts should read the innocent owner
provision of § 881 (a) (7) in the conjunctive).
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applicable theory of formal logic, advanced this argument as a canon
of statutory construction. He suggested that Congress may have used
"or" to create a conjunctive, requiring claimants to prove both a lack
of knowledge and a lack of consent.91 Judge Greenberg focused on
the general rule that each term connected by a disjunctive must be
given a separate meaning.92 He reasoned that the words "knowledge"
and "consent" each relate back to the offense, so if the government
had the burden of proving claimants' "knowledge or consent,"93 the
prosecutor could satisfy the statute by proving either one.9 4 He con-
cluded that substituting the term "with" for "without" makes that
point clear,95 and therefore claimants must prove both.9 6
The government has also relied upon De Morgan's theorem. In
United States v. 890 Noyac Rd.,97 the government cited De Morgan's
theorem in support of its argument that courts should read the "inno-
cent owner" provision of § 881(a) (7) in the conjunctive. 98 The gov-
ernment pointed out that reading the clause in the disjunctive is
"painfully inconsistent with one of the most fundamental rules of
grammar and syntax."99 Although the court ultimately agreed, and
found that the clause should be read in the conjunctive, it based its
holding on canons of statutory construction, legislative history,100 and
subsequent indications of Congressional intent.10 1 The court was
hesitant to rest its decision upon De Morgan's theorem, because, as
Judge Wexler stated, "logic and syntax do not exist in a vacuum." 102
Judge Wexler's concern echoes that ofJustice Holmes, who once
noted that the scope of a specific clause within a statute should not be
limited to its particular subject matter, and that a statute's "general
91 "In as much as the words 'knowledge' and 'consent' are separated by an 'or' they are
disjunctive and each relates back to the offense. Accordingly, unless the owner demon-
strates that the offenses were committed without either her knowledge or consent she
loses. It is that simple." United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 890 F.2d 659, 661 (3d Cir. 1989),
sur petition for reh 'g (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
92 Id.; see also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979). This analysis is fur-
ther supported by Francis McCaffrey who notes that "it is a rule in the construction of
statutes that, in the first instance, the grammatical sense of the words is to be adhered to."
FRANcIs J. MCCAFFREY, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 53 (1953).
93 6109 Grubb Rd., 890 F.2d at 662 (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
94 Id.
95 Id. This argument is also supported by the legislative history of 21 U.S.C.
§ 881 (a) (6), the relevance of which will be thoroughly discussed. See infra notes 119 to 132
and accompanying text.
96 6109 Grubb Rd., 890 F.2d at 662 (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
97 739 F. Supp. 111 (E.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd, 945 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1991).
98 Id. at 113.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 114.
101 Id. at 114-15.
102 Id. at 113.
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purpose is a more important aid to the meaning than any rule which
grammar or formal logic may lay down."10 3 Many courts agree and
attempt to use a statute's general purpose to determine Congressional
intent when a statute's grammar appears to lead to a result that is
contrary to its stated purpose.10 4 Courts interpreting the "innocent
owner" provision of § 881 (a) (7) should adhere to Justice Holmes' sug-
gestion, because a conjunctive reading of the "innocent owner" clause
is not only grammatically and logically correct, 0 5 but it also comports
with Congress' announced purpose in § 881(a) (7): to "enhance the
use of forfeiture... as a law enforcement tool in combating one of
the most serious crime problems facing the country."106 By contrast,
reading § 881 (a) (7) in the disjunctive would make it easier for prop-
erty owners to resist forfeiture-including owners who know about
the illegal activity on their property and implicitly condone it.107
Given the otherwise sweeping scope of Congress' action in this area, it
seems highly unlikely that Congress intended such a result, when its
primary concern was to remove the profit motive from drug
trafficking.
Using a similar canon of construction, several courts insist that
the "innocent owner" provision of § 881 (a) (7) must allow claimants to
prove either a lack of knowledge or a lack of consent, because any
other reading would render the "consent" prong of the clause super-
fluous.' 0 8 Since, under a conjunctive interpretation, knowledge of an
illegal activity is sufficient for the government to take a claimant's
property, courts would not permit claimants who fail to prove a lack of
103 United States v. Whitridge, 197 U.S. 135, 143 (1905).
104 See United States v. Shirey, 359 U.S. 255, 260-61 (1959); NLRB v. St. Luke's Hosp.
Ctr., 551 F.2d 476, 482 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Lanni, 66 F.2d 1102, 1108 (3d Cir.
1972); United States v. Patriarca, 807 F. Supp. 165, 189 (D. Mass. 1992), vacated, 4 F.3d 70
(1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct 1644 (1994); United States v. Glasgow, 389 F. Supp.
217, 226 (D.C. 1975).
105 See Copi, supra note 86, at 29.
106 S. R P. No. 225, supra note 9, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3374.
107 See United States v. 890 Noyac Rd., 739 F. Supp. 111, 114 (E.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd 945
F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[I]n the context of § 881, the phrase 'know or consent' would
lead to absurd results if it were read as giving claimant the option of proving either one or
the other. For then it would be possible for an owner to know about, and perhaps even
tacitly condone illegal drug activity, and yet still be able to claim that she did not 'know or
consent' to the activity.").
108 United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 878 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1109 (1991) ("Requiring a claimant to disprove both knowledge and consent... renders
the phrase 'or consent' superfluous."); United States v. Forfeiture, Stop Six Ctr., 781 F.
Supp. 1200, 1208 (N.D. Tex. 1991) ("The Court refuses to follow a construction of the
statute that completely disregards the word 'consent'."); United States v. 5.935 Acres of
Land, 752 F. Supp. 359, 362 (D. Haw. 1990) (noting that a conjunctive interpretation of
the innocent owner clause of § 881 (a) (7) "renders the words 'or consent' in the statute
completely superfluous").
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knowledge to offer proof that they did not consent to the illegal activ-
ity. 10 9 This construction of § 881(a) (7), they reason, "completely dis-
regards the word 'consent'."" 0 In addition, these courts apparently
assume that knowledge is a prerequisite to consent. They posit that
under a conjunctive interpretation, courts will not consider the issue
of consent until the claimant proves a lack of knowledge. They reason
that since a claimant must know about illegal drug activity to consent
to it, requiring claimants to prove a lack of both knowledge and con-
sent requires deserving claimants to do the impossible."'
Both of these arguments are defective. The idea that courts must
read § 881 (a) (7) in the disjunctive to give appropriate weight to the
"consent" prong fails, because even under a disjunctive interpretation
the issue of "consent" is not raised. Once claimants demonstrate their
lack of knowledge, they do not need to show a lack of consent, be-
cause they have satisfied the terms of the statute-even if they were
willfully blind (i.e., suspected drug activity, but condoned it by doing
nothing) .112
Also, the premise upon which these courts rely-that it is impossi-
ble to consent to something without first having knowledge of it-is
erroneous. 113 The manner in which the courts have defined the
terms "knowledge" and "consent" makes it possible for claimants to
consent to illegal drug activity on their property without having knowl-
edge of that activity. The "innocent owner" provision of § 881 (a) (7)
does not define either of these words. As a result, the courts have had
to develop and apply their own definitions.
A majority of courts, whether they follow a conjunctive or disjunc-
tive interpretation, have found that by "knowledge," Congress meant
"actual" knowledge, rather than "constructive" knowledge. 1' 4 The dif-
109 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 878.
110 Forfeiture, Stop Six Ctr., 781 F. Supp. at 1208.
111 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 878 ("In order to [consent to] something, it is only com-
mon sense that one must have knowledge of it. Thus... to consent to drug activity, one
must know of it."); 5.935 Acres, 752 F. Supp. at 362 ("[O]bviously proof of no knowledge
will automatically prove no consent, since one cannot consent to something about which
one does not know.").
112 890 Noyac Rd., 739 F. Supp. at 113.
113 United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 890 F.2d 659, 662 (3d Cir. 1989) (Greenberg, J.,
dissenting).
114 See, e.g., United States v. 6960 Miraflores Ave., 995 F.2d 1558, 1561 (11th Cir. 1993);
United States v. 7326 Highway 45 N., 965 F.2d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v.
$10,694.00 U.S. Currency, 828 F.2d 233, 234-35 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Four Mil-
lion, Two Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand, 762 F.2d 895 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v.
8848 S. Commercial St., 757 F. Supp. 871, 906 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
A minority of courts have required claimants to show a lack of both "actual" and "con-
structive" knowledge. See, e.g., United States v. 121 Nostrand Ave., Apartment 1-C, 760 F.
Supp. 1015, 1020 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); United States v. 2901 S.W. 118th Ct., 683 F. Supp. 783,
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ference is significant. A standard requiring "constructive" knowledge
forces claimants to prove that they had no knowledge of illegal activity
and that they had no reason to know about it. Under an "actual"
knowledge standard, however, claimants need to show only that they
had no personal knowledge of illicit drug activity on their property.
Similarly, although some courts have defined "consent" to include im-
plicit as well as explicit approval by requiring claimants to take all rea-
sonable steps to prevent the illegal use of their property," 5 most
courts and commentators define "consent" solely as an express ap-
proval of illegal activity.116
This combination of actual knowledge and explicit consent allows
claimants to consent to something without first having knowledge of
it. For instance, consider a homeowner who takes a vacation and asks
a friend to house-sit. The homeowner, aware that the friend sells
drugs, tells the friend to make himself at home. The friend moves in
and begins selling drugs. The homeowner has no actual knowledge of
his friend's drug dealing in the house and has not given express con-
sent to use the house for such purposes. Consider also an absentee
landlord who rents to a suspected drug dealer, but remains indiffer-
ent to the use of his property." 7 These examples illustrate that it is
possible to impliedly consent to something without having actual
knowledge of it. Courts which afford claimants this luxury encourage
the type of "willful blindness" that allows those with some level of cul-
pability to avoid an otherwise proper forfeiture.
Although principles of logic and canons of construction compel a
conjunctive reading of the "innocent owner" provision of § 881 (a) (7),
the fact that many courts have read this provision in the disjunctive
788 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
115 See 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 870. That court adopted the ordinary meaning of
"consent," found in WEBSTER'S THiRD NEw INTERNATiONAL DICTiONARY 482 (1971), defined
as "compliance or approval especially of what is done or proposed by another." Id. at 878.
The court in 141st St. Corp. defined a "lack of consent" as doing "all that reasonably could
be expected to prevent the illegal activity once [the owner] learned of it." Id. at 879. See
Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689 (1974). See infra notes 161
to 166 and accompanying text.
116 United States v. Approximately 4,657 Acres, 730 F. Supp. 423, 427 (S.D. Fla. 1989);
United States v. Certain Real Property, 724 F. Supp. 908, 914 (S.D. Fla. 1989); United
States v. 171-02 Liberty Ave., 710 F. Supp. 46, 49-50 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). See also Alice M.
O'Brien, "Caught in the Crossfire": Protecting The Innocent Owner of Real Property From Civil
Forfeiture Under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7), 65 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 521, 546-48 (1991).
117 SeeJudge Greenberg's dissent in 6109 Grubb Rd., 890 F.2d at 662, which relies on the
'actual knowledge" standard adhered to by most courts. Here, the hypothetical landlord
was clearly on notice that illegal activity could occur on his property, yet he chose to ignore
the possibility. This state of mind, referred to as "willful blindness," and its place in the




suggests that it is hopelessly abstruse.' 18 And those charged with inter-
preting this provision must go beyond mere examination of its plain
meaning in order to discern congressional intent.
B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
1. (a)(6) as Evidence of the Proper Interpretation of (a)(7)
When it is impossible to determine Congressional intent by exam-
ining a statute's language, it is necessary to turn to legislative his-
tory.1 9 However, in enacting § 881(a) (7), Congress focused more on
improving criminal forfeiture than on expanding the types of prop-
erty subject to civil forfeiture. As a result, the legislative history of
§ 881 (a) (7) is extremely sparse. The only mention of the "innocent
owner" provision was the announcement that § 881 (a) (7) "would also
include an 'innocent owner' exception like that now included in"
§ (a) (6).120 Thus, many courts have turned to the legislative history of
§ 881 (a) (6) in interpreting § 881 (a) (7).121
For example, in United States v. 6109 Grubb Road, the government
seized the property of a suspected drug trafficker. 122 After the de-
fendant was convicted of drug trafficking, the government initiated
the forfeiture of the property under § 881 (a) (7).123 The defendant's
wife raised the innocent owner defense, claiming that she neither
knew of nor consented to the illicit activity. 124 When she failed to
prove a lack of knowledge, the court considered whether she could
still attempt to prove a lack of consent. The court noted that the legis-
lative history of § 881 (a) (7) was insufficient 25 and stated that because
the legislative history of § 881 (a) (7) refers to § 881 (a) (6), the court
"must also look to the legislative history of that section .... ,"126 The
portion deemed relevant was a joint congressional committee report
which stated that the property encompassed by § 881(a) (6) "would
118 The Second Circuit recognized that "the plain language of section 881(a) (7) is, at
best, confusing." 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d at 878.
119 "We resort to legislative materials... when the congressional mandate is unclear on
its face." City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 199 (Powell, J., dissenting), reh'g
denied, 447 U.S. 916 (1980).
120 S. REP. No. 225, supra note 9, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3398.
121 The legislative history has been cited by courts arguing for a disjunctive interpreta-
tion, and those arguing for a conjunctive one. United States v. Lot 111-B, 902 F.2d 1443,
1445 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 894 F.2d 1511, 1514 (l1th
Cir. 1990); 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d at 625; United States v. 890 Noyac Rd., 739 F. Supp.
111, 114 (E.D.N.Y. 1990), rev'd, 945 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1991).
122 886 F.2d at 618.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 620.
125 Id. at 624.
126 Id. at 625.
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not be subject to forfeiture unless the owner of such property knew or
consented to" the use of the property for illegal drug activity.127
Although principles of logic would require courts to consider Con-
gress' use of a negative as a requisite that claimants prove both ele-
ments, the court concluded that it should read § 881(a) (7) in the
disjunctive and allowed the wife to offer proof of lack of consent.128
The court in 6109 Grubb Road reached this conclusion by neglect-
ing the very piece of legislative history it had cited. After stating the
necessity of referring to the legislative history of § 881 (a) (6), and
pointing to the specific passage from the committee report, the court
simply ignored the statement's implications that claimants must prove
a lack of both knowledge and consent.129 Instead, the court found
that canons of statutory construction require a disjunctive reading. 30
Had the court examined the passage, it would have become clear that
the phrase "unless the owner of such property knew or consented to"
establishes that if claimants either know about or consent to illicit
drug activity, they cannot succeed in demonstrating innocent owner-
ship.' 3 ' Stated in the positive, the phrase would read: "the property
would be subject to forfeiture unless the owner of such property neither
knew of nor consented to" the illegal conduct. Therefore, claimants
must prove a lack of both knowledge and consent. Thus, the legisla-
tive history of § 881(a) (7) demonstrates that Congress intended to
create an "innocent owner" clause "like that [one] now included in"
§ 881 (a) (6), which is read in the conjunctive. Judge Greenberg cor-
rectly realized "that Congress has been consistent in its use of the...
phrase 'knew or consented,'" and claimants must therefore prove
both a lack of knowledge and a lack of consent to satisfy the "innocent
owner" provision of § 881(a) (7).132
127 Joint Explanatory Statement of Titles II and III, 124 CONG. REc. S17,647 (1978),
reipinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9518, 9522-23.
128 6109 Grubb Rd.. 886 F.2d at 625.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 626.
131 The court in Lot 111-B based its decision entirely upon this explanation, stating first
that "a congressional joint committee report explaining the identical language of Section
881 (a) (6) leaves no doubt as to the proper interpretation of the 'knew or consented' lan-
guage," and then concluding that "if the claimant either knew or consented to the illegal
activities, the 'innocent owner' defense is unavailable." United States v. Lot 111-B, 902
F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1990).
One commentator asserts that although the explanatory statement is persuasive, it is
not conclusive because it places the burden of proof on the government, which is inconsis-
tent with established forfeiture procedure. See Loomba, supra note 90, at 484. The state-
ment, however, does not suggest a shifting of burdens, it merely attempts to clarify
Congressional intent by presenting an alternative way to view the necessary statutory
requirements.
132 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d at 663. One commentator argues that the legislative history
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2. Recent Revelations Regarding § 881(a)(7)
Although the legislative history of § 881 (a) (6) offers insight into
Congress' intent regarding the "innocent owner" provision of § 881
(a) (7), the fact that Congress did not comment further on § 881
(a) (7) leaves open the question 'of whether Congress itself read the
"innocent owner" clause in the conjunctive or the disjunctive. How-
ever, the subsequent legislative history of § 881 (a) (7) provides addi-
tional evidence that Congress intended the "innocent owner" clause
of § 881 (a) (7) to require that claimants prove a lack of both knowl-
edge and consent.
Generally, courts do not consider subsequent legislative history
helpful in determining Congress' original intent when enacting a stat-
ute. In fact, the Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that subse-
quent legislative history is normally an unreliable way of discerning
Congressional intent.133 Yet the Court has recognized that in certain
circumstances subsequent legislative history is a useful guide to con-
gressional intent, and the Court has continued to use it as a valid in-
terpretive tool.' 3 4 For example, in Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., Shell bought
the rights to an oil shale claim that was discovered in 1918.135 The
Department of the Interior denied Shell's claim, finding it invalid be-
cause oil shale was not considered a valuable mineral deposit under
the general mining laws of 1872.136 The Court relied on subsequent
legislative history and department action-including Department of
the Interior instructions issued after the 1920 Act went into effect-to
determine that pre-1920 oil shale claims were valid under the Act.' 3 7
of § 881 (a) (6) is inapplicable to § 881 (a) (7) because § 881 (a) (6) applies exclusively to
bona fide purchasers. See O'Brien, supra note 116, at 537-40. This argument has been
rendered moot by the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. 92
Buena Vista Avenue, 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993). The Court interpreted the "innocent owner,
clause of § 881 (a) (6), and held that "the protection afforded to innocent owners is not
limited to bona fide purchasers." Id. at 1134. The Court, in a plurality decision, noted that
the term "owner" appears in the statute three times, and is never qualified. According to
the Court, "[s]uch language is sufficiently unambiguous to foreclose any contention that it
applies only to bona fide purchasers." Id. at 1139.
Since § 881(a) (6) does not apply exclusively to bona fide purchasers, courts can, and
should use its legislative history and its conjunctive construction to discern Congress' in-
tent regarding § 881(a) (7).
133 See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, reh'g denied, 501 U.S. 1270 (1991).
134 See Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 628 (1990); Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 222
(1985); Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982); United States v. Vogel
Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 31 (1982); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Director, Office of Work-
ers' Compensation Programs, U.S. Dep't of Labor, 449 U.S. 268, 275 (1980); Examining
Bd. of Engineers, Architects and Surveyors v. Flores De Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 590 (1976).
135 446 U.S. 657 (1980).
136 Id. at 660.
137 Id. at 665-66.
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Chief Justice Burger recognized that arguments based on subsequent
legislative history have to be made and weighed carefully, but deter-
mined that the Court should not discard them. 38 He noted Chief
Justice Marshall, who once exclaimed that "[w]here the mind labours
to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing from
which aid can be derived."13 9
The Supreme Court points out that it should not consider a stat-
ute's subsequent legislative history when it can glean the statute's
meaning by its language or its legislative history.140 This is sound ad-
vice, but since the plain language of § 881(a) (7) is what has caused
the controversy, and since there is no specific legislative history to illu-
minate the question, any subsequent discussion of the provision is
helpful in understanding how courts should read the clause.
Numerous members of Congress have proposed amendments to
the "innocent owner" provision of § 881 (a) (7) to bring it into con-
formity with the "innocent owner" provision of § 881 (a) (4) as
amended in -1988.141 Those proposed amendments would have added
"willful blindness" as an additional element of the "innocent owner"
defense. 142 For instance, Senator Dole introduced the National Drug
Control Strategy Implementation Act of 1990 on behalf of the office
of National Drug Control Policy. The bill included an amended ver-
sion of the "innocent owner" clause of § 881(a) (7) to replace the
phrase "without the knowledge or consent of that owner," with "with-
out the knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the owner." This
particular change was designed to clearly establish that claimants with
knowledge of illegal drug activity cannot avoid forfeiture merely by
showing a lack of consent to that activity. The accompanying analysis
of the amendment states that it is "intended that, in order to establish
the innocent owner exemption, the property owner must establish all
three circumstances-i.e., that the owner lacked knowledge, consent,
and willful blindness as to the offense giving rise to forfeiture." 143 It
expressly condemned the 6109 Grubb Road decision that claimants
could prove either a lack of knowledge or a lack of consent,'4 and
announced that the "addition of the 'willful blindness' prong under-
138 Id. at 666, n.8.
139 United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 358, 386 (1805).
140 Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 (1980).
141 136 CONG. REC. S6586, S6605 (daily ed. May 18, 1990).
142 Id. at S6595. "Sections 511(a) (6) and (7) of the Controlled Substances Act (21
U.S.C. 881(a) (6) and (7)) are each amended by striking 'without the knowledge or con-
sent of that owner' and inserting in lieu thereof 'without the knowledge, consent, or willful
blindness of the owner. ... Id.
143 Id. at S6605.
144 Id. at S6605-06.
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scores the incorrectness of' the holding in 6109 Grubb Road, "since it
makes no sense that an owner could prevail by showing a lack of will-
ful blindness to the offense even though the owner had knowledge of
the offense and consented to it."145
Although this amendment did not pass, the significance of the
proposal should not be underestimated. Congress enacted § 881
(a) (7) in 1984, but the question of how to read the "innocent owner"
clause was not raised in the circuits until 1989. This amendment-
which directly addresses that question-was introduced less than one
year later. Additionally, the agency in charge of setting drug policy
suggested the amendment.1 46 In fact, Senator Biden proposed an
identical amendment,147 and the Senate approved an identical
amendment as part of the Omnibus Crime Bill of 1990.148 Senator
Kennedy also introduced an amendment to the "innocent owner" pro-
vision of § 881(a) (7) and was even more careful to insure that courts
would read it in the conjunctive. He replaced the current clause with:
"if the owner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the
act or omission giving rise to the forfeiture was committed or omitted
without the owner's knowledge, without his or her consent, and with-
out his or her willful blindness. " 149 Apparently, Congress is attempt-
ing to clarify the ambiguity in § 881 (a) (7) that has plagued courts for
almost ten years.
C. FAIRNESS
Courts reading the "innocent owner" provision of § 881 (a) (7) in
the disjunctive believe that requiring owners to forfeit their property
merely because they had knowledge of illegal activity would lead to
unduly harsh results.150 They feel that Congress enacted the "inno-
cent owner" defense to shield those with knowledge, but not responsi-
bility for the crime, from the severity of forfeiture.' 5 ' Accordingly,
they assert that forcing claimants to prove a lack of both knowledge
and consent wrongly treats those with knowledge as full participants
145 Id. at S6606.
146 136 CONG. REc. S6586 (daily ed. May 18, 1990). Although Chevron, U.S., Inc. v.
NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984), probably does not obligate courts to defer to agency
interpretation in civil forfeiture cases, the fact that the people who set drug policy, and the
agency enforcing the statute-the Department of Justice through its prosecutors-inter-
pret § 881 (a) (7) in the conjunctive is persuasive.
147 136 CONG. REc. S9250, S9273 (daily ed. June 28, 1990).
148 136 CONG. REc. S10,184, S10,238 (daily ed. July 20, 1990).
149 136 CoNc. REc. S7154, S7156 (daily ed. June 5, 1990) (emphasis added).
150 6109 Grubb Rd., 886 F.2d at 624.
15' United States v. 418 57th St., 922 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1990).
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in a crime. 152
Those courts adhering to a conjunctive interpretation maintain
that Congress' primary purpose in enacting § 881 (a) (7) was to re-
move the profit motive from drug trafficking by seizing all real prop-
erty substantially connected to that trafficking.153 Thus, allowing
claimants who were aware of illicit drug activity on their property to
avoid forfeiture is contrary .to Congressional policy 5 4 and would se-
verely undermine the efficiency of the Government's forfeiture
effort.155
To determine whether or not the "innocent owner" clause of
§ 881 (a) (7) -creates injustices under certain circumstances, it is neces-
sary to examine the terms "knowledge" and "consent." As stated, a
majority of courts have ruled that Congress intended "knowledge" to
mean "actual" knowledge, rather than "constructive" knowledge. 56
Obviously, a standard based on actual knowledge creates less of a bur-
den for claimants to meet than a standard based on constructive
knowledge, because claimants need to show only that they had no per-
sonal knowledge of illegal drug activity on their property. 57
Even though actual knowledge is less of a burden for claimants,
the actual knowledge standard is most likely the correct interpretation
of Congress' intent. The legislative history of § 881(a) (4) indicates
that Congress did not intend the term "knowledge" to encompass the
concept of truth avoidance. The initial proposal in 1988 to amend
§ 881 (a) (4) by adding an "innocent owner" provision did not contain
any language referring to willful blindness. Congress later added a
"willful blindness" prong to alleviate concerns that the amendment
"would lead to a 'look-the-other-way' defense," 5 8 and to "prevent the
owner of a conveyance from closing his eyes to a violation."'159 There-
fore, the absence of a "willful blindness" prong in § 881 (a) (7) "con-
strains courts to employ... [an actual knowledge standard] rather
than... [a constructive knowledge] standard for assessing the claim-
ant's knowledge." 160
152 United States v. 141st Street Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 878 (2d Cir 1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 1109 (1991).
153 United States v. Lot 111-B, 902 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1990).
154 Id.
'55 Id.
156 See supra text accompanying note 114.
157 The courts that have adopted this standard have done so after noting that nothing in
either the statute itself, nor the legislative history, suggests that courts need to assess
whether or not claimants should have known about illegal drug activity on their property.
See supra note 114.
158 134 CONG. REc. 24,086 (1988) (statement of Rep. Archer).
159 134 CONG. PEc. 33,313 (1988) (statement of Rep. Jones).
160 United States v. 7326 Highway, 965 F.2d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 1992). The fact that
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The debate over whether "consent" includes an implicit approval
of illegal activity stems from the "all reasonable steps" requirement set
out in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Company.161 In Calero-To-
ledo, the claimant leasing company leased a yacht to certain Puerto
Rican residents. 162 After the authorities found marijuana on board,
they seized the yacht pursuant to the Puerto Rican Controlled Sub-
stances Act.' 63 The leasing company learned of the seizure when it
tried to repossess the vessel from the lessees who had failed to pay
their rent.164 Although the claimant was not involved with the illegal
activity, and had no knowledge of it, the Court, in an opinion byJus-
tice Brennan, upheld the constitutionality of the forfeiture procedure
under the statute. The Court noted that the leasing company volunta-
rily entrusted the lessees with the yacht and offered no proof that it
had done all that it reasonably could have done to prevent its property
from being used illegally.' 65 In much cited dicta, however, the Court
acknowledged that it might be unconstitutional to cause property
owners to forfeit their property if those owners were both uninvolved
in, and unaware of, the illegal activity, and if they had done all that
reasonably could be expected to prevent that illegal use.166 This dicta
has become known as the "Calero-Toledo" defense and has prompted
courts to consider whether such a standard is applicable to cases
originating under § 881 (a) (7), and if so, the extent to which it
applies.
Presently, courts have taken one of three positions regarding the
Calero-Toledo defense and § 881 (a) (7). Certain courts have con-
cluded that the Calero-Toledo defense is not applicable to cases
originating under § 881 (a) (7).167 Other courts have incorporated the
Congress has proposed amendments to § 881 (a) (7) which include the insertion of a "will-
ful blindness" prong also indicates the current constraints on how courts define "knowl-
edge." See supra section IV B-2.
161 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
162 Id. at 665.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 668.
165 Id. at 690.
166 Id. at 689. Also, in dicta, the Court related two situations which might create an
exception to the rule that the innocence of the owner is irrelevant to forfeiture
proceedings:
[I] t would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of an owner whose property
subjected to forfeiture had been taken from him without his privity or consent ....
Similarly, the same might be said of an owner who proved not only that he was
uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that
reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property; for, in
that circumstance, it would be difficult to conclude that forfeiture served legitimate
purposes and was not unduly oppressive.
167 United States v. 4,657 Acres, 730 F. Supp. 423, 427 (S.D. Fla. 1989); United States v.
Certain Real Property, 724 F. Supp. 908, 914 (S.D. Fla. 1989); United States v. 171-02 Lib-
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defense into the "innocent owner" provision of § 881 (a) (7) as an ad-
ditional requirement which claimants must prove to avoid forfei-
ture.168 And yet another group of courts has used the Calero-Toledo
dicta to define the boundaries of the term "consent." 69
Those courts which reject the applicability of the Calero-Toledo
defense to cases arising under § 881 (a) (7) maintain that the Supreme
Court's statement in Calero-Toledo is irrelevant because it "dealt with
constitutional defenses to a forfeiture statute which did not incorpo-
rate the express 'knowledge or consent' defense contained in § 881
(a) (7)."170 These courts seem to believe that the statute's definitions
of "knowledge" and "consent" do not encompass the Calero-Toledo
standard of reasonable steps. 171 In fact, these courts contend that had
Congress intended to incorporate the Calero-Toledo standard into the
"innocent owner" defense of § 881 (a) (7), it would have done so, be-
cause the Supreme Court decided Calero-Toledo ten years before Con-
gress enacted § 881(a) (7).172 Because Congress did not adopt that
requirement, courts cannot read the statute to include it now.
Those courts which have incorporated the Calero-Toledo defense
into the "innocent owner" clause of § 881(a) (7) have not provided
much explanation for doing so. They apparently believe that the
Supreme Court's dicta revealed the extent of the burden borne by
claimants seeking the innocent ownership exemption. Therefore, not
only are claimants required to prove their lack of "actual" knowledge
or lack of consent or both, but also that they did all that could be
reasonably expected to prevent illicit use of their property. 73
erty Avenue, 710 F. Supp. 46, 49-50 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
168 United States v. Route 2, Box 61-C, 727 F. Supp. 1295, 1299 (W.D. Ark. 1990); United
States v. 11885 S.W. 46 St., 715 F. Supp. 355, 357-58 (S.D. Fla. 1989); United States v. 2901
S.W. 118th Court, 683 F. Supp. 783, 788 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
169 United States v. 418 57th St., 922 F.2d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. 141st
Street Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 879 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 1109 (1991); United
States v. 908 T St., 770 F. Supp. 697, 702 (D.D.C. 1991); United States v. Ponce, 751 F.
Supp. 1436, 1441 (D. Haw. 1990).
170 4,657 Acres, 730 F. Supp. at 427.
171 United States v. 171-02 Liberty Avenue, 710 F. Supp. 46, 50 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) ("Here,
the court is concerned with the precise meaning of the statutory defense set forth in
§ 881 (a) (7).") (emphasis in original).
172 4,657 Acres, 730 F. Supp. at 427.
173 Courts have phrased this standard differently. The court in Route 2, Box 61-C ruled
that claimants must: (1) be uninvolved in the wrongful activity;, (2) unaware of the wrong-
ful activity; and (3) have done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the wrong-
ful use of their property. United States v. Route 2, *Box 61-C, 727 F. Supp. 1295, 1299
(W.D. Ark. 1990). The court in 11885 46th Street stated it in this manner. "[The claimant]
carries this burden by showing that she did not know of the property's connection to drug
trafficking, and that she took every reasonable precaution to prevent the property's use in
drug trafficking." United States v. 11885 46th St., 715 F. Supp. 355, 357-58 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
See also United States v. 118th Court, 683 F. Supp. 783, 788 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (declaring
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Lastly, those courts which use the Calero-Toledo standard to define
the borders of the "consent" requirement of the "innocent owner'
clause of § 881 (a) (7) seem to view it as a rationalization for interpret-
ing the statute in the disjunctive. 174 Once claimants have actual
knowledge of illegal activity on their property, they can avoid forfei-
ture only by proving a lack of consent, which is accomplished by show-
ing that they have done all that could reasonably be expected of them
to prevent that illegal activity from continuing. This approach is
touted as balancing the announced congressional purposes of
preventing drug trafficking and protecting the constitutional rights of
innocent owners. 175
1. The Correct Application
Courts should not incorporate the Calero-Toledo defense into
§ 881 (a) (7) to impose an additional burden on claimants. Had Con-
gress wanted to codify the Calero-Toledo standard in § 881(a) (7), it
could have done so when it added that provision in 1984. Legislative
history of the 1988 amendments to § 881 (a) (4) lends strength to this
conclusion. When Congress debated the addition of a "willful blind-
ness" prong to § 881 (a) (4), those who endorsed the idea made it clear
that "this section [was] not intended to overturn existing case law ren-
dered under the Supreme Court decision in Calero-Toledo ... -"176 The
"willful blindness" provision of § 881 (a) (4) was meant to require the
same "reasonable expectation" standard as courts adopting the Calero-
Toledo standard had required. 177 Since Congress added a "willful
standard similar to that used in 11885 46th Street).
174 United States v. Ponce, 751 F. Supp. 1436, 1441 (D. Haw. 1990). ("Mere knowledge
of illicit activity on one's property is enough to allow forfeiture of that property, if the
claimant does not do all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the illegal activity
once he or she learns of it.").
175 "We find the Calero-Toledo standard appropriate for section 881 (a) (7) forfeiture cases
because, when combined with our construction of the phrase 'knowledge or consent,' it
provides a balance between the two congressional purposes of making drug trafficking
prohibitively expensive for the property owner and preserving the property of an innocent
owner." United States v. 141st Street Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 879 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied
498 U.S. 1109 (1991). See also United States v. 19 and 25 Castle St., 31 F.3d 35, 40 (2d Cir.
1994); United States v. 418 57th St., 922 F.2d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 1990) ("[W]e balanced our
determination of the knowledge-consent issue with a stringent interpretation of consent
...."). A significant difference between courts following this standard, and those courts
using the Calero-Toledo dicta as an additional prong, is that claimants are expected to have
taken reasonable steps after the illicit activity has been discovered. In jurisdictions where
the Calero-Toledo defense is considered a separate requirement, claimants must prove that
they took reasonable steps to prevent wrongful activity from occurring at all.
176 134 CONG. REc. H11,108, Hl1,245 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988).
177 "The language of Calero-Toledo and the line of cases that follow require property own-
ers to be reasonably informed concerning the purpose for which another person may use
their property. This provision in the bill before us is intended to allow the courts to deter-
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blindness" prong to the "innocent owner" clause of § 881(a) (4), but
has not added one to the "innocent owner" clause of § 881(a) (7),
Congress cannot have intended the Calero-Toledo standard to apply to
the "innocent owner" clause of that provision.' 78 Therefore, as the
statute is written, claimants ought to be able to demonstrate a lack of
consent simply by showing that they gave no express approval to the
illegal activity.
2. Applying Definitions to Determination of Fairness
The proper definitions of both "knowledge" and "consent" create
the minimum burden for claimants. They have to show only that they
had no actual knowledge of the particular activity giving rise to forfei-
ture and that they did not expressly consent to it. But combining the
low threshold Congress has created for successful claimants with a dis-
junctive interpretation of the "innocent owner" provision of
§ 881 (a) (7) leads to results which are both undesirable and contrary
to Congress' stated intent.179 Under such a reading, owners could tac-
idy condone illegal drug activity on their property without giving ex-
press consent and avoid forfeiture even though they had actual
knowledge. A good example of this is the claimant in United States v.
171-02 Liberty Avenue,180 who was the landlord of a building where
dealers sold their drugs out of a second floor apartment.' 8 ' The po-
lice sought his cooperation on numerous occasions.'8 2 The dealers
responded by building fences around the property to obstruct police
surveillance and installing steel doors with peepholes and multiple
slide bolt locks to fortify the floor against police raids. 183 Begrudg-
ingly, the claimant agreed to press trespassing charges against non-
resident dealers and buyers arrested by the police' 8 4 and to allow the
police to tear down the fortifications.8 5 He refused, however, to fire
the building's caretaker, who police believed to be one of the drug
traffickers.' 8 6 In addition, ongoing renovation made it difficult for
police to distinguish the legitimate workers from those hired by the
mine whether owners have taken the type of actions contemplated by the Supreme Court
I.. ,d
178 See O'Brien, supra note 116, at 546-48 (determining that the Calero-Toledo defense
is inapplicable to cases arising under § 881(a) (7) because it would impose an additional
burden on claimants which Congress did not intend).
179 See supra notes 103 to 112 and accompanying text.
180 710 F. Supp. 46 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
181 Id. at 47.
182 Id. at 47-48.
183 I& at 47.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 48.
186 Id. at 47-48.
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drug dealers to erect the fences and steel doors. One detective sent
the claimant a letter asking him to provide each legitimate contractor
with his business card. 87 If workers failed to produce the card the
police would arrest them for trespassing. 188 After police arrested a
drug dealer who was carrying the detective's business card, they
ceased their efforts to enlist the claimant's cooperation and seized the
building.189 However, because the court interpreted the "innocent
owner" provision of § 881 (a) (7) in the disjunctive, the claimant
avoided forfeiture by proving lack of consent.' 90
The injustice of this outcome was made possible because the
court interpreted the statute in the disjunctive. The court noted that
the claimant had cooperated with the police by pressing trespassing
charges and allowing the police to raze the barricades erected by the
drug dealers.19 The court then stated, that given the statute's re-
quirements, it could not "comprehend why [the claimant] was obli-
gated to provide even this much cooperation in order to avoid
forfeiture . "... 192
The court noted however, that being arrested for trespassing was
only a minor inconvenience, because "two hours later they would be
back."' 93 Further, instead of forbidding his tenants from putting up
the fences and steel doors, the landlord forced the police to expend
resources and energy tearing them down. And the large sums of cash
generated from the sale of drugs made it simple for the dealers to
have the barricades quickly replaced. 194 The claimant argued that he
felt threatened by the drug dealers and did not want to risk getting
injured. 195 Although this explanation may have been true, and would
make his actions reasonable, any collaborator wishing to avoid forfei-
ture could raise this defense. Such a defense, if allowed, would gut
the government's efforts to abate drug trafficking.
A conjunctive interpretation provides the government with a
greater ability to combat drug trafficking. That interpretation may
also lead to injustice under certain circumstances where owners genu-
inely try to stop illegal drug activity on their property.196 If, however,
187 Id. at 48.
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 50, 52.
191 Id. at 50.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 52.
194 Id. at 48.
195 Id. at 51-52.
196 For example, in United States v. 908 T St., 770 F. Supp. 697 (D.D.C. 1991), the
claimant was the father of numerous grown children living in his home. 'The police made
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owners who find themselves in that situation honestly desire to rid
their property of the illicit activity, they should notify the proper au-
thorities. Those authorities could take the steps necessary to alleviate
the problem and protect the owners from any potential harm. Even if
the owners' relatives are involved in the illegal activity, the law does
not allow them to do anything less. "At some point the obligations of
citizenship in a drug-ridden society must overcome [family] loyalty
and even [family] intimidation."' 97
Further, the United States Supreme Court has recently recog-
nized significant constitutional protections for claimants whose real
property has been seized. In Austin v. United States,198 the Court held
that the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause applies to civil
forfeiture. 199 Also, in United States v. Good,200 the Court held that the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the govern-
ment from seizing real property without first giving the owner notice
and the opportunity to contest the seizure at a pre-seizure hearing.20'
The application of these provisions to civil forfeiture provides ample
protection against potential inequities.
Also, the constitutional concerns discussed in Calero-Toledo would
not arise within the context of a § 881(a) (7) forfeiture. The Court
noted that forfeiture may be unconstitutional if claimants had neither
"actual" nor "constructive" knowledge (i.e. they truly had no idea),
and that they did everything they could do-prior to the illegal use of
their property-to prevent that illegal use from occurring.202 A con-
junctive interpretation of § 881 (a) (7) does not allow forfeiture in that
situation. As stated, under § 881 (a) (7) property cannot be forfeited
unless claimants had "actual" knowledge or explicitly consented to il-
legal activity. According to the Court in Calero-Toledo, once either of
several searches of the property and found drugs belonging to some of the children. After
authorities seized the house, one of his daughters testified that her father had taken all
reasonable steps to prevent illegal drug activity on his property. The claimant's daughter
testified that once her father learned that his children brought drugs into the house, he
kicked them out, and encouraged them to enter drug abuse treatment programs. He also
put new locks on the doors and nailed the windows shut to prevent them from returning
until they were no longer using drugs. Under a conjunctive interpretation, the claimant
could still have lost his home. The court might not have considered the steps he took to
prevent his children from bringing drugs onto his property.
197 United States v. Sixty (60) Acres, 727 F. Supp. 1414, 1420 (N.D. Ala. 1990).
198 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
199 Id. at 2812. For a complete analysis of the Court's decision in Austin v. United States,
see David Lieber, Note, Eighth Amendment-The Excessive Fines Clause, Austin v. United States,
113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993), 84J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 805 (1994).
200 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993).
201 Id. at 505.
202 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689 (1974).
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these circumstances is proven, forfeiture is constitutional.2 03
To argue that a conjunctive reading of the "innocent owner" pro-
vision of § 881 (a) (7) is improper because it may result in unfairness,
is to forget why Congress enacted the statute. Congress' purpose was
to strengthen the government's ability to fight illegal drug traffick-
ing-an effort ivhich already costs the American public tens of billions
of dollars a year and has been largely unsuccessful.20 4 The fact that
Congress provided some protection for innocent owners cannot allow
the statute as a whole to be suborned. It is important to remember
that prior to the enactment of § 881 (a) (7), real property owners had
no defense at all against forfeiture.2 0 5 Congress appears to have rec-
ognized the need to protect truly innocent owners. However, Con-
gress did not give owner's rights precedence over the government's
interest in finding an effective method of depriving drug dealers of
their profits. Since the definition of "innocent" is "acting in good
faith, and without knowledge of incriminatory circumstances," 20 6 the
only way that claimants truly meet this default is by proving both a lack
of knowledge and a lack of consent. Only then can courts be sure that
the owners are innocent and deserve to keep their property.
V. SOLUTION
It is obvious that the current statute creates certain inequities.
Therefore, Congress should amend the statute to eliminate the nega-
tive effects on both the government and the claimants. Inserting a
"willful blindness" prong and incorporating the Calero-Toledo de-
fense would be one way to accomplish this objective. This would alle-
viate the concerns of both sides. The incorporation of the Calero-
Toledo defense would prevent the government from taking property
from claimants like the father in 908 T Street,20 7 who may have known
about the illegal activity, but took positive steps to thwart it. Similarly,
the inclusion of a "willful blindness" prong would eradicate the gov-
ernment's concern that claimants, like the landlord in 171-02 Liberty
Avenue, could silently condone the illegal activity on their property,
yet avoid forfeiture.
To prevent further confusion, Congress could take care to word
the statute clearly. A possible example might be:
The claimant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or
she was not willfully blind to the fact that someone was using the prop-
203 Id.
204 See BuREAu OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 8.
205 See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 683.
206 BLACK'S LAW DICTiONARY 788 (6th ed. 1990).
207 See supra note 196.
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erty for illegal purposes. If a claimant is found to have been willfully
blind, he or she cannot be considered an innocent owner. If a claimant
succeeds in proving that he or she was not willfully blind, the claimant
must then prove that he or she did not have actual knowledge that the
property was connected to illegal drug activity. If, however, the claimant
is found to have had actual knowledge of the illegal activity, and as a
result of that knowledge, had done all that could be reasonably expected
to prevent the illegal activity from continuing, that claimant's property
shall not be forfeited.
VI. CONCLUSION
Until Congress chooses to amend the statute, courts must read
the "innocent owner" provision of § 881 (a) (7) in the conjunctive. A
logical reading of the clause, its legislative history, the legislative his-
tory of related clauses, subsequent clarifications, and basic principles
of equity require claimants to prove both a lack of knowledge and a
lack of consent to satisfy the innocent owner requirement of
§ 881(a) (7). Perhaps the injustices of the current "innocent owner"
provision which this comment has pointed out, will prompt Congress
to take action to help clear the smoke from the battlefield of the gov-
ernment's war on drugs.
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